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CRIMINAL COURT, QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Iftikhar'
(decided September 11, 2000)
The facts of this case were supplied by the complaining
witness, Luis Rodriguez. 2  On March 15, 2000 at 10:25 p.m.,
while Rodriguez was driving a motor vehicle in Queens County,
the defendant, Iftilhar, entered the vehicle and demanded to be
driven to the Midtown Tunnel. 3 Iftikhar represented that he was a
New York City Police Officer, and to this end displayed a Police
Department Shield.4 Nevertheless, Rodriguez refused to drive
Iftikhar to the tunnel.5 After Rodriguez's refusal, Iftikhar pulled a
firearm and "threatened Mr. Rodriguez's well being and placed
him in fear of serious physical injury."6 Rodriguez ran away from
the vehicle, and while doing so he heard a gun shot fired. After
fleeing the vicinity of the vehicle, Rodriguez called the police who
later arrived and arrested Iftikhar. Additionally, the officer
recovered an NYPD- Detective shield from Iftikhar.
The accusatory instrument, or complaint, against the
defendant contained far fewer details.8 Based upon the complaint,
the defendant was charged with, (1) the violation of § 120.14 of the
Penal Law, Menacing in the second degree;9 (2) the violation of
§ 120.20 of the Penal Law, Reckless Endangerment in the second
degree; 10 (3) the violation of the Administrative Code of the City
of New York § 14-.107, Possession of a Police Shield; I and (4)
1 713 N.Y.S.2d 671, 185 Misc. 2d 565 (Crim. Ct. New York County 2000).
2 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 673, 185 Misc. 2d at 568.
3id.
4 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 674, 185 Misc. 2d at 568.5 id.
6id.
7id.
8 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 673, 185 Misc. 2d at 567. The complaint read as
follows. "Deponent states that at the above mentioned date, time and place of
occurrence, he is informed by the complainant, Luis Rodriguez, that the
defendant, Khurram Iftikhar, did fire a gun placing the complainant in fear of
serious physical injury. Deponent further states that he did recover a full size
detective shield from the defendant's right rear pocket." Id.
9 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.14 (1) (2000).
10 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (2000).
" ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 14-107. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
1
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violation of § 240.26 of the Penal Law, Harassment in the second
degree. 12  The defendant argued that the charges against him
should have been dismissed because the accusatory instrument was
defective.
Sections 170.35's and 170.3014 of the Criminal Procedure
Law provide a defendant the opportunity to dismiss a misdemeanor
complaint as being defective. In order for a complaint to be valid
it must contain "non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true,
every element of the offense charged in the accusatory part of the
information."' 5  Additionally, the misdemeanor complaint must
contain "facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to
support the charges."'
16
The people attempted to cure the jurisdictional defects in
the complaint, via an affirmation containing specific facts in
accordance with §§ 100.1517 and 100.4018 of the Criminal
It shall be unlawful for any person not a member of the police
force to represent himself or herself falsely as being such a
member with fraudulent design upon persons ... or to have,
use, wear or display without specific authority from the
commissioner any.., shield... in any way resembling that
worn by members of the police force.
Id.
12 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (1) (2000).
13 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35 (2000) Provides in pertinent part: "(a) It is
not sufficient on its face pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40." Id.
N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (c) (2000) Provides in pertinent part: "Non-
hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any
supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged
and the defendant's commission therof." Id.
14 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.30 (2000) Provides in pertinent part: "[U]pon
motion of the defendant, dismiss such instrument or any count thereof upon the
ground that: (a) it is defective within the meaning of section 170.35." Id.
15 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (1)(c) (2000).
16 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 100.15 (3) (2000).
17 Id., providing in pertinent part:
The factual part of such instrument must contain a statement
of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character
supporting or tending to support the charges. Where more than
one offense is charged, the factual part should consist of a
single factual account applicable to all the counts of the
accusatory part. The factual allegations may be based either
[Vol 17
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Procedure Law.19 Despite the people's subsequent affirmation, the
court held that the complaint did not satisfy the statutory
requirements of an information, and was thus jurisdictionally
defective.20  The court, with respect to Reckless Endangerment,
Menacing, and Harassment charges, ruled accordingly because the
accusatory instrument did not allege specific facts demonstrating
that the defendant committed the charged offenses.21 "In fact, the
accusatory instrument [did] not even allege the physical proximity
of defendant to the complaining witness at any time during the
incident."2 2 Furthermore, the people did not include any facts that
the alleged gun was even a real.gun, in fact the court hypothecated
that the "gun" may have actually been a pellet gun or a starter's
pistol.23 Next the court pointed out that the complainant merely
"heard" a gun shot, he did not see the gun being fired, or, more
importantly, did not see the defendant fire a weapon.
24
The third count against the defendant was for his violation
of § 14-407 of the Administrative Code. 25 The administrative code,
making it unlawful to use a police shield, criminalizes two distinct
types of conduct. The first prohibition under the administrative
code criminalizes misrepresentations that one is a member of the
police force with fraudulent design.26 However, this section of the
statute did not apply to the defendant in this case, because the
misdemeanor complaint does not allege that the defendant
represented that he was a member of the police force. 7 Instead,
upon personal knowledge of the complainant or upon
information and belief.
Jd.
18 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (1)(c) (2000) provides in pertinent part:
"that in order for an information or a count thereof to be sufficient on its face,
every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof
must be supported by non-hearsay allegations of such information and/or any
supporting depositions." id.
'9 Ifiikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 674, 185 Misc. 2d at 568.20 Id.
21Id., 185 Misc. 2d at 569.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 id.
25 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 14-107.
26 Id.
27 lfikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 674-75, 185 Misc. 2d at 569.
2000
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the people were required to rely on the second type of conduct the
administrative code criminalizes, which makes it illegal to "have,
use wear or display" a shield in a manner resembling a police
department shield.2 8 The defendant challenged this portion of the
code as unconstitutionally vague under both the Federal 29 and New
York30 State Constitutions.
To help analyze the constitutionality of any penal law the
court must conduct a two-pronged analysis to determine if a statue
is "void for vagueness." 3 1 Firstly, a penal statute must define the
particular criminal offense with specificity so that ordinary people
will not be confused as to what conduct is criminal under the
statute. 32 Secondly, the statute must not be written in a manner
that encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 33  The
Court reasoned that if a statute is constructed without protective
guidelines then persons in power, such as police officers and
prosecutors, would be free to arbitrarily and randomly pursue their
personal targets.34 Moreover, penal statutes must provide adequate
notice so that an individual will not be criminally liable for
conduct that he reasonably believes to be lawful.35
In Iflikhar, the court concluded that neither prong of the
vagueness test was satisfied.36 The first element was not satisfied,
because the vague wording of the statute made adherence difficult
even for the "innocent minded. 37  The court explained the
28 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 14-107.
29 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 675, 185 Misc. 2d at 570 (the defendant alleged that
the people violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution).
See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation." Id.30 N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 11.
31 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982) (holding that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague within the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it encouraged arbitrary enforcement). See also People v.
Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 307 (1987) (adopting an identical vagueness two part
analysis to determine if a statute in question is constitutional).
32 id.
33 Id.
34 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,574 (1974).
15 U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).36 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 676, 185 Misc. 2d at 571.
37 id.
[Vol 17
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common, and seemingly legal practice of the fashion industry,
which will occasionally design clothing to resemble police
uniforms. 38  Furthermore, buttons similar to the ones worn by
police officers are available at sporting good stores. 39 The statute
provided little guidance for the average citizen, and thus failed the
notice requirement of the first prong of the test.4 °
The second prong of the vagueness test iss not directed at
individuals' understanding of the law, but rather it establishes
minimum guidelines for the purpose of regulating law
enforcement.4  This second prong protects individuals from
potential violations of their Firs t Amendment liberties, 42 and may
therefore be the most significant requirement of the vagueness
test.43 Supreme Court Justice Powell discussed the importance of
the second test in Lewis v. City of New Orleans.4  The prong
prohibiting arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is virtually the
only safeguard limiting the broadpower of the police to arrest and
charge individuals with crimes.4V "The opportunity for abuse,
especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended
interpretation, is self evident," and therefore such statutes have
been deemed unconstitutionally vague.
46
New York State courts have interpreted the New York
State Constitution47 to bar penal laws when it is entirely possible
for reasonable minds to differ as to what the statute seeks to
prohibit.48 The New York Court of Appeals explained that statutes
must give a reasonable person "subject to its notice of what is
prohibited and what is required of him."49 However, there exists a
strong presumption that a statute enacted by the legislature is
" Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 677, 185 Misc. 2d at 572.
39 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 676, 185 Misc. 2d at 571.
40 Id.
41 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
42 Id.
41 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 676, 185 Misc. 2d at 572.
44 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
45 Id.
46Id. at 136.47 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (2000).
48 People v. Schenck, 154 Misc. 2d 937, 944 (City Ct. of Buffalo 1992).
49 People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 337 (1969).
2000
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constitutionally valid.50  As long as the court determines that
minimally fair notice of what the statute prohibits exists, the court
will not hold a statute to be unconstitutionally vague on its face.
51
In Iftikhar, the court acknowledged that the defendant was
charged, in the misdemeanor complaint, with possessing a full size
detective's badge.52 Although the complaint was more specific
than the language of the statute, nevertheless, application of the
statute was still constitutionally vague. 53 The court explained that
the complaint merely alleged that the defendant possessed the
shield. 4 Holding such a complaint valid would give too much
discretion to the police officer in interpreting an open-ended
statute.55 It must be noted, however, that when a defendant's
actions are clearly within the meaning of a statute the court is less
likely to hold that the statute is open-ended or unclear. Therefore,
by ruling that the statute is unconstitutionally vague the court
implicitly stated that the mere possession of a badge was not
necessarily the type of criminal behavior that the Administrative
Code sought to legislate against. 6
The court correctly concluded that the accusatory
instrument may not be corrected, despite the people's attempt to do
so. 57 New York Criminal procedure law requires a misdemeanor
complaint to allege specific factual allegations against the
defendant. 58 The purpose of this requirement is twofold; it enables
a criminal defendant to prepare for trial and also guards against re-
prosecution.59  The New York courts have determined that
protection afforded by the penal law may be traced back to the
New York Constitution Article I, § 6.60 Furthermore, a defective
5 0 id.
5 Richmond Boro Gun Club v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 681, 684 (2d Cir.
1996) (the more common way that a court may invalidate a statute is by
challenging the statute on First Amendment grounds).
52 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77, 185 Misc. 2d at 572.
13 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 677, 185 Misc. 2d at 572.
54 id.
55 Id.56 fiikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 677, 185 Misc. 2d at 572.57 Iftikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 674, 185 Misc. 2d at 568.58 N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 100.15.
59 People v. McDermott, 69 N.Y.2d 889, 890 (1987).
60 People v. Sanchez, 84 N.Y.2d 440, 446 (1994).
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misdemeanor complaint may not be cured by the people's attempt
to supplement the original accusatory instrument. 6 The purpose of
an information is to reasonably enable a defendant to prepare for
trial.62 In the case at bar the complaint did not meet these criteria,
and for this reason the court concluded that the people may not
supplement the original complaint.
63
For the aforementioned reasons, the court's analysis is
consistent with both the State Constitution of New York and with
the Federal Constitution. The decision reached by the court relies
heavily on fundamental rights rooted in the preponderance of case
law as well as the State and Federal Constitutions. Therefore, it is
likely that the court's decision and similar trial court decisions will
similarly be affirmed.
Aron Rattner
61 People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138 (1987).
62 Id. at 136.
63 Ifikhar, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 674, 185 Misct 2d at 568.
2000
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